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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the great amount of attention to emerging markets, much still remains unknown about firm performance in 
emerging economies. To fill this gap, this study aims to investigate factors that influence labor productivity of firms 
in Brazil, China, India, and Russia (BRIC countries). This study focuses on features of business environments of 
emerging markets such as informality, corruption, foreign ownership, and external audit. Using a cross-national 
sample of 8,885 firms from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys dataset, we find that informality is negatively 
associated with labor productivity, while corruption and external audit are positively related to labor productivity. 
Implications will be discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
merging markets are very unstable and rapidly growing markets (Luo & Park 2001; Puffer, McCarthy & 
Boisot 2010). Since the early 2000s, emerging markets have played a critical role in the global economy 
(Holtbrügge & Kreppel, 2012). Among the emerging markets, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), 
have been considered as the fastest growing large economies (De Vries, Erumban, Timmer, Voskoboynikov & Wu 
2012; Djankov, Miguel, Qian, Roland & Zhuravskaya, 2005). These countries have large potential for future 
contribution to the world economy because of the sizes of their population and economy (De Vries et al. 2012: 212). 
For instance, China and India have not only shown economic growth above the world average but also contributed to 
the world GDP growth during the past decade (De Vries et al. 2012). Brazil has been considered as a center of Latin 
American markets with the population of 626 million (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
2015), and Russia has shown relatively rapid economic growth among the developing countries in Europe (Djankov 
et al. 2005). 
 
As the importance of emerging markets has grown, the literature on BRIC has been enriched. However, the extant 
literature on these economies mainly focused on the characteristics of the business environment such as investment 
attractiveness (e.g., Alaimo, Fajnzylber, Guasch, Lopez & Oviedo, 2009) and the institutional environment (e.g., 
Eunni & Manolova, 2012). Such approaches, which are mainly based on country-level contexts, contribute to 
understanding the business environment of emerging economies. For instance, similar to other transition economies, 
BRIC is characterized by formal institutional voids—poor social overhead capital, ineffective legal systems, high 
levels of corruption, and so on—which in turn limit their transition into developed economies. However, it is unknown 
how such factors resulting from formal institutional voids affect firm-level performance in emerging markets such as 
BRIC. Therefore, it is necessary to determine what affects firm performance in BRIC. Yet, there is little empirical 
research that analyzes firm performance in BRIC.   
 
Thus, this study aims to investigate the determinants of firm performance in BRIC countries. In particular, we examine 
which factors affect labor productivity in BRIC. As labor productivity refers to the efficiency of the workforce, much 
E 
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research uses it as an important indicator of firm performance (e.g., Chen, Hope, Li & Wang, 2001; Kang & Chung, 
2015).  
 
Drawing on the perspective of institutional voids, we focus on informality, firm bribery, external audit, and foreign 
ownership. In emerging economies, governments are more likely to have high levels of control over resources; 
administrative procedures for businesses are complex and time consuming; financial markets (including bank systems 
and stock markets) are under-developed; ownership is concentrated to a few shareholders, particularly owners and 
their families; and the level of monitoring of managerial decision is low. Because business environments can restrict 
firm decisions, these features of emerging markets can affect firm efficiency. Thus, we analyze how the 
abovementioned five organizational behaviors and characteristics influence labor productivity.   
 
The current research makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, this study contributes to the literature 
on emerging markets by providing an understanding of firm performance in emerging markets. Using firm-level data, 
this study analyzes the factors that influence labor productivity of firms in BRIC. Second, this study will contribute 
to the literature on international business by providing indicators for comparing firm productivity among BRIC and 
presenting results based on these indicators. Although the four countries have common characteristics such as 
institutional voids, they also have some differences in their business environments. Therefore, it is necessary to 
identify which factor affects labor productivity in each country. In addition, by providing empirical evidence of 
determinants of labor productivity, this study has important practical implications for companies that are planning or 
considering moving into BRIC or other emerging markets. Likewise, the findings from this research may provide 
useful suggestions for policymakers, which contribute to improving labor productivity of emerging markets. 
 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Institutional Environment of Emerging Markets 
 
Emerging markets are defined as a very fast-growing and dynamic economy (Luo & Park, 2001). Also, emerging 
economies are characterized by less-developed institutions or institutional voids (Kang & Chung, 2015). The 
institutional environment, which consists of formal and informal norms, values, and rules (Eunni & Manolova, 2012: 
172), influences firm behaviors in doing business by limiting firms from obtaining resources for firm growth 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Similar to other emerging markets, BRIC countries have certain common elements of 
institutional environments (Eunni & Manolova, 2012): high levels of corruption and informality (e.g., Baik, Lee & 
Lee, 2015) resulting in inefficiency of the government, poor corporate governance due to less-developed financial 
markets, low costs of workforce, high levels of uncertainty or risk (e.g., Fey & Denison, 2003), and so on.  
 
First, corruption is more salient in emerging markets, which in turn influences the efficiency of the economy (Aidt, 
2009; Gill, Kharas & Bhattasali, 2007). In addition, Spencer and Gomez (2011: 280) state that violation of or 
conformity to the corruption norm can influence firm performance in emerging markets where such norms have been 
institutionalized. Wu (2009: 75) states that corruption will have a negative effect on business costs by increasing the 
cost of production and the cost of financing. For example, in Asian emerging markets, corruption is likely to increase 
the business cost by 5% (Kraar, 1995).  
 
Next, emerging markets are characterized by poor corporate governance, because they have less-developed financial 
regulations. In addition, in transitional economies, ownership is likely to be concentrated to a few controlling 
shareholders or family member. Concentrated ownership is likely to provide controlling shareholders with a motive 
to divert firm resources because there is information asymmetry between the outside shareholders and controlling 
shareholders (Morck, Yeung & Yu, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002; Fan & Wong, 2002). Family-run 
firms are more likely to be involved in bribery than others because they seek long-term management control (Wu, 
2005). Moreover, poor accounting practices in emerging markets can have negative impacts on firm performance as 
they decrease the effort to reduce business costs such as bribery. Considering that the principles of good corporate 
governance tend to improve firm performance (Wu 2009), corporate governance can influence firm performance.  
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2018 Volume 34, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 327 The Clute Institute 
From the perspective of institutional voids, we focus on informality, bribery, external audit, and foreign ownership 
because they are appropriate candidates that may affect firm performance in emerging markets, as we demonstrate 
below.  
 
2.2 Informality 
 
Informality plays a critical role in emerging economies, because such economies are likely to involve a great amount 
of unregistered businesses and employment in the informal sectors (Alaimo et al. 2009; Schneider & Enste, 2000). 
There are different definitions of informality among scholars (e.g., Ruiz, Pérez, Bona & Santana, 2009). In this study, 
informality is related to unregistered businesses that are less likely to be monitored by the regulatory authority because 
it is relevant to firm level performance. Precisely, informality is defined as competition with unregistered rivals. 
 
High levels of informality mean that unregistered firms form a large part of an economy (Amin 2011; Gonzalez & 
Lamanna, 2007). Djankov et al.’s (2005) findings imply that emerging markets tend to have larger informal economies 
because regulatory burdens are positively associated with firm entry costs (Levie & Autio, 2011). Firms in the informal 
sector can benefit from low costs because they are less concerned with paying taxes and following regulations or laws 
(Baik et al. 2015). It would be likely that companies in the formal sector that compete with unregistered rivals are 
more likely to suffer from such disadvantages than their counterparts. This implies that having unregistered 
competitors should be negatively associated with organizational performance in emerging markets where regulatory 
burdens are relatively high. Moreover, some studies provide evidence that competition with firms in the informal 
sector has negative effects on firm performance (e.g., Kang & Chung, 2015).  
 
2.3 Bribery 
 
The definition of corruption is categorized into two types: 1) bribes paid to government officials (LaPalombara, 1994; 
Luo 2005) and 2) exchanges between two private parties (Coase 1979). However, as the majority of firm bribes are 
paid to government officials (Luo 2005), this study focuses on bribery to public officials, as such bribery is a common 
type of corruption that deteriorates management quality (Lee & Weng, 2013). 
 
Some factors that influence firm bribery are the level of the economic development (Husted 1999), cultures (Husted, 
1999; Martin, Cullen & Johnson, 2007), and top-management characteristics (Collins, Uhlenbruck & Rodriguez, 
2009). For example, as corruption is common in countries where the government has monopoly over resources (Alam, 
1995), bribes have been regarded more common in emerging markets or transition economies where the gross 
domestic product (GDP) is low and legal systems are less developed (Husted 1999; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck & Eden 
2005; Sanchez, Gomez & Wated, 2008). Husted (1999) also states that economic development is negatively associated 
with corruption and that inequality in income distribution is more likely to have a negative effect on corruption.  
 
In addition, cultural values affect the level of corruption (Husted, 1999; Martin et al. 2007). In particular, power 
distance (Husted 1999), masculinity (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Husted, 1999), and uncertainty avoidance (Husted 1999) 
are positively related to corruption. Compared with developed economies, BRIC is characterized by higher levels of 
power distance, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance (Eunni & Manolova, 2012). Moreover, Research on corruption 
uses the Bribe Payers index (BPI)1 reported by Transparency International (2011) as an indicator of the extent to which 
a certain country is corrupt (e.g., Spencer & Gomez, 2011). The BPI ranks Brazil, India, China, and Russia as 14th, 
19th, 27th, and 28th, respectively. Much research has provided strong support for the negative effect of corruption on 
economic development (Lambsdorff, 2003; Wei, 2000); however, there is little empirical support for effects of 
corruption on firm performance in emerging markets (e.g., Lambsdorff, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
the extent to which bribery affects labor productivity in BRIC.  
 
2.4 External Audit 
 
The agency theory suggests that inside controllers are more motivated to provide information favorable to themselves 
to outsiders. Conducting external audits is likely to reduce information asymmetries between corporate insiders and 
                                                             
1 The index ranks 28 countries depending on the perceived likelihood of firm bribery abroad.  
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outside shareholders by increasing the credibility of financial records (Dopuch & Simunic, 1982). Considering that 
high control concentration is likely to increase agency problems (González & García-Meca, 2014), external auditors 
can play an important role in mitigating the agency problems. Companies audited externally are less likely to engage 
in unlawful behaviors such as earning management (Chen et al. 2011). In order to mitigate the agency problem, an 
external audit may be a reasonable choice for firms in emerging markets where the concentration of ownership is high, 
because external independent audits play a role in monitoring managerial decisions (Fan & Wong, 2005).  
 
Moreover, external audit is expected to lead to improvement in labor productivity in emerging markets by enhancing 
transparency in business operation (Samudhram, Stewart, Wickramanayake & Sinnakkannu, 2014). When employees 
observe that their leaders engage in unethical behaviors, their trust in managers is likely to decrease, while their 
organizational cynicism tends to increase (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003). Such negative attitudes of employees 
toward their employing organizations have negative effects on their job performance (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 
2003). This implies that employees may have positive attitudes toward their job when they perceive the integrity of 
their employing organizations. Considering this, an external audit may be positively associated with labor 
productivity. Moreover, institutions wherein ownership is concentrated to one or a few controlling owners are less 
likely to have motives to employ a high-quality auditor (Fan & Wong, 2005: 42). Therefore, employees are more 
likely to perceive integrity when a company is externally audited, which in turn may contribute to labor productivity 
in emerging markets.  
 
2.5 Foreign Ownership 
 
Ownership structure has remarkable effects on management decisions such as firm strategies, resource allocation, and 
so on (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Monitoring power also comes from ownership structure, and monitoring 
management decisions result from ownership structure (González & García-Meca, 2014). Previous literature on the 
ownership structure of emerging markets has paid attention to insider (internal) ownership, ownership concentration, 
and family ownership (e.g., González & García-Meca, 2014) because 1) firms are likely to be owned by family 
members; 2) the proportion of ownership held by major shareholders is large; and 3) majority shareholders participate 
in the management. 
 
In emerging markets, however, foreign ownership can also play a critical role in firm performance. In general, as 
foreign investors are less likely to be connected to controlling shareholders such as top management, they have more 
incentives to monitor managerial decisions efficiently (Chen, Chiou, Chou & Syue, 2009). Some studies found that 
foreign ownership has positive effects on organizational performance in transitional economies such as Brazil (e.g., 
Beck, Crivelli & Summerhill, 2005; Crystal, Dages & Goldberg, 2001), India (e.g., Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999; 
Khanna & Palepu 1999), and China (e.g., Buckley, Wang & Clegg 2007; Greenaway, Guariglia & Yu, 2014) by using 
appropriate monitoring skills. Further, some studies report that foreign investors contribute to improvement in firm 
performance, such as labor productivity and profitability, in transition economies (e.g., Claessens & Djankov, 1999). 
 
To our knowledge, little empirical research has been conducted on identifying factors that influence labor productivity 
in BRIC. Thus, this study aims to investigate how much informal competition, external audit, bribery, and foreign 
ownership affect labor productivity of firms in BRIC.  
 
3. METHOD 
 
3.1. Sample: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 
 
The current study uses the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) data2 in order to analyze the effects of test 
variables on labor productivity. Interviewing business owners or top managers with standard survey instruments, 
World Bank has collected firm-level information that includes a variety of business issues such as firm characteristics, 
corruption, performance measures, and so on. The country data are comparable because WBES employs standardized 
questionnaires. Therefore, this study can benefit by incorporating WBES data of the four BRIC countries.  
 
                                                             
2 Further information on the WBES data can be downloaded from http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. 
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We developed a cross-country sample of 8,885 firms from the WBES dataset in order to analyze the extent to which 
the test variables influence labor productivity. We excluded observations with incomplete information for the test 
variables of this study such as corruption, informal competition, and so on. The WBES are conducted for 15–20 
countries per year, which are updated around every three to five years. We used the most recent wave of the WBES: 
Surveys conducted in Brazil in 2009, China in 2009, Russia in 2012, and India in 2014. Table 1 presents the 
characteristics of the sample. There are 6,125 (68.9%) manufacturing, 1,343 (15.1%) wholesale and retail, 1,024 
(11.5%) service, and 393 (4.4%) construction firms. The average firm age is 15.7 years (SD = 13.3); the average 
number of employees is 133.04 (SD = 626.56); 6% are exporters; 37.43% of firms have between 21 to 99 employees; 
and 139 (1.56%) are listed on the stock exchange. With regard to the country, Brazil, Russia, India, and China comprise 
5%, 25%, 60%, and 10% of the overall sample, respectively. 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the Sample 
Category BRIC Brazil Russia India China 
Industry 
Wholesale & retail (%) 1,343 24 914 313 92 (15.12%) (4.71%) (41.23%) (5.91%) (10.62%) 
Construction (%) 393 3 209 148 33 (4.42%) (0.59%) (9.43%) (2.80%) (3.81%) 
Service (%) 1,024 48 247 573 156  (11.53%) (9.41%) (11.14%) (10.83%) (18.01%) 
Manufacturing & other (%) 6,125 435 847 4,258  585  (68.94%) (85.29) (38.20%) (80.46%) (67.55%) 
Ave. Firm age (yrs.) 15.69 19.89 10.19 18.28 11.47 (SD =13.32 ) 
Ave. Firm size (employees) 133.04 79.43 121.69 147.12 107.69 (SD =626.56) 
Firm size: Small  
(employees ≤99, %) 
3,326  242 655 2,121  308  
(37.43%) (47.45%) (29.54%) (40.08%) (35.57%) 
Firm size: Medium or Large (100+ 
employees, %) 
3,413  167 979 1,892  375  
(38.41%) (32.75%) (44.16%) (35.75%) (43.30%) 
Subsidiary of large firms (%)  1,591  107 164 1,198  122  (17.91%) (20.98%) (7.40%) (22.64%) (14.09%) 
Market type  
(domestic market, %) 
8359  485 2059 5003 812  
(94.08%) (95.10%) (92.87%) (94.54%) (93.76%) 
Listed on s stock exchange (%) 139 (1.56%) 13(2.55%) 0 (0%) 99(1.87%) 27 (3.12%) 
 
 
3.2 Estimations (Labor productivity equations) 
 
In order to analyze the effects of the explanatory variables on labor productivity, we used an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) model by including alternatives that may affect the outcome variable. We estimated a simple linear regression 
for labor productivity as follows: 
 𝑦" = 	𝛼	 +	𝛽"(𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡	𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)	+ 𝛾"𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠	 +	𝜀"	,  
 
where yi refers to labor productivity (sales per employee, in logs); Test variables refers to the labor productivity 
determinants (informality, bribery, external audit, and foreign ownership) discussed in Section 2, Controls refers to 
control variables, and ε is a random error term. Several control variables are included in the model to control for their 
possible effects on labor productivity. More specifically, we consider firm age, firm size, subsidiary status, export 
sales (%), external financing (%), listing status, tax inspection, market type, and dummies for industry and country in 
the regression model for the total sample. Dummies for country are excluded in the regression model for each country. 
To control for firm age and firm size, we use the natural logarithm transformation of firm age and firm size dummies 
(small size: 1 = less than 21 employees, 0 = otherwise; medium size: 1 = 21≤ employees ≤ 99, and 0 = otherwise; 
large size as a base). Moreover, a firm’s subsidiary status (1 = part of a large firm, 0 = otherwise), listing status (1 = 
listed firms, 0 = unlisted ones), tax inspection (1 = firms having a tax inspection, 0 = otherwise), and market type (1 
= the main market of the firm is domestic, 0 = otherwise) are controlled using dummy variables. To mitigate the effects 
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of the size of export sales and external financing, we include the percentages of external sales and external financing 
as control variables, respectively. Finally, in order to control for industry and country effects, dummies for industry 
(dummies for wholesale and retail, construction, and service industries; manufacturing and other industries as a base) 
and country (dummies for Russia, India, and China; Brazil as a base) are considered. Based on the model variables 
discussed above, we construct the ordinary least square regression model for the total sample as follows:  
 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑎 + 𝛽>𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽B𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽D𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 +𝛽4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛	𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 +	𝛾1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚	𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛾2𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚	𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 	𝛾4𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 +𝛾R𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛾S𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 +	𝛾T𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 + 𝛾U𝑇𝑎𝑥	𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +𝛾V𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 +	𝛾>X𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒	&	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛾>>𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +	𝛾>B𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	 + 𝛾>D𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎	 + 𝛾>\𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑎 + 𝛾>R𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎  
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of the model variables, while Table 3 presents the 
ordinary least squares regression analysis results of both the total sample and individual country samples. Positive 
coefficient estimates indicate the positive effects of the corresponding explanatory variables on labor productivity, 
while negative ones indicate the negative effects. As seen in Table 2, the correlations among test variables are not 
high, and the variance inflation factors of the variables are less than five, implying that our study may not have a 
serious multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
No. Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Labor productivity  10.07 1.89 1.00      
2. Informality 0.40 0.49 −0.11*** 1.00     
3. Bribery 0.33 0.47 0.09*** −0.10*** 1.00    
4. External audit 2.55 0.63 0.18*** −0.03** 0.24*** 1.00   
5. Foreign ownership 0.01 0.10 0.07*** −0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00  
6 Firm age 2.55 0.73 0.13*** −0.09*** 0.34*** −0.01 −0.24*** 1.00 
7. Small size 0.37 0.48 0.01 −0.01 0.10*** −0.01 −0.12*** 0.27*** 
8. Medium size 0.38 0.49 −0.02† 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04*** −0.04*** 
9. Subsidiary status 0.18 0.38 −0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** −0.05*** 0.05*** 
10. Export sales 0.07 0.21 0.05*** 0.01 −0.05*** −0.01 0.09*** −0.13*** 
11. External financing 0.31 0.34 0.00 0.06*** −0.05*** 0.01 0.12*** −0.15*** 
12. Listing status 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.03** 0.04** −0.02* 0.07*** 
13. Tax inspection 0.55 0.50 −0.04*** 0.00 −-0.04*** 0.00 0.25*** −0.04*** 
14. Market type 0.94 0.24 −0.08*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 −0.10*** 0.10*** 
15. Wholesale & retail 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.02* −0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** −0.15*** 
16. Construction 0.04 0.21 −0.02 0.01 −0.03** −0.02 0.04*** −0.08*** 
17. Service 0.12 0.32 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.03** 
18. Russia 0.25 0.43 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.04*** 0.12*** −0.29*** 
19. India 0.60 0.49 −0.35*** −0.01 −0.17*** −0.11*** −0.09*** 0.25*** 
20. China 0.10 0.30 0.24*** −0.01 0.14*** 0.05*** 0.03* −0.06*** 
(Table 2 continued on next page) 
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(Table 2 continued) 
 
No. Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
7. Small size 1.00       
8. Medium size −0.61*** 1.00      
9. Subsidiary status 0.01 0.00 1.00     
10. Export sales −0.18*** −0.01 0.00 1.00    
11. External financing −0.01 0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 1.00   
12. Listing status −0.01 0.00 0.13*** −0.01 −0.01 1.00  
13. Tax inspection −0.03** 0.00 −0.07*** 0.01 0.06*** −0.01 1.00 
14. Market type 0.13*** 0.01 −0.01 −0.70*** −0.03** 0.00 0.00 
15. Wholesale & retail −0.05*** 0.04*** −0.04*** 0.01 0.00 −0.02† −0.01 
16. Construction −0.02* 0.01 −0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 
17. Service −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02† −0.01 
18. Russia −0.09*** 0.07*** −0.16*** 0.01 0.05*** −0.02 −0.07*** 
19. India 0.07*** −0.07*** 0.15*** −0.01 −0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03** 
20. China −0.01 0.03** −0.03** 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.04*** 
 
No. Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
14. Market type 1.00       
15. Wholesale & retail −0.03** 1.00      
16. Construction −0.01 −0.09*** 1.00     
17. Service −0.02† −0.15*** −0.08*** 1.00    
18. Russia −0.03** 0.42*** 0.14*** −0.01 1.00   
19. India 0.02* −0.31*** −0.10*** −0.03** −0.70*** 1.00  
20. China 0.00 −0.04*** −0.01 0.07*** −0.19*** −0.40*** 1.00 
Notes. N = 8,885.  
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 
 
Table 3 provides results for when the regression is performed over each sample. First, the regression results based on 
the total sample are reported in the column of BRIC. Variable informality is negatively related to labor productivity 
(β = -0.30, p < .001), indicating that higher number of informal competitors lead to lower labor productivity. On the 
other hand, bribery is positively associated with labor productivity (β = 0.31, p < .001), which indicates that greater 
corruption leads to greater labor productivity. Similar to bribery, external audit has strong positive effects on labor 
productivity (β = 0.79, p < .001). This suggests that firms that have an external audit are more likely to have relatively 
higher levels of labor productivity compared with their counterparts. The regression results based on each country are 
shown in the column for the corresponding country. Except Brazil, the other three countries have a similar pattern of 
relations between the test variables and labor productivity. Specifically, compared with other explanatory variables, 
the external audit has relatively large effects on productivity in all four countries; Brazil, β = 0.44, p < .001; Russia, β 
= 1.07, p < .001; India, β = 0.66, p < .001; and China, β = 1.0, p < .001. In addition, informality has significant negative 
effects on labor productivity in Russia (β = −0.41, p < .001), India (β = −0.26, p < .001), and China (β = −0.38, p < 
.001), while it is not significant for Brazil (β = −0.06, ns). For Brazil, bribery has the largest effect on labor 
productivity. Interestingly, with respect to bribery, informality has significant positive effects on productivity in 
Russia (β = 0.43, p < .001) and India (β = 0.27, p < .001), while it is negatively related to productivity in Brazil (β = 
−0.63, p < .01). Finally, bribery is insignificant in China (β = −0.04, ns).  
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Table 3. Regression result for Labor Productivity (OLS) 
Variable BRIC (N = 8,885) 
Brazil 
(N = 510) 
Russia 
(N = 2,217) 
India 
(N = 5,292) 
China 
(N = 866) 
Intercept 12.04*** 10.95*** 9.84*** 8.32*** 8.32*** 
Independent variables      
Informality −0.30*** 0.06 −0.41*** −0.26*** −0.38*** 
Bribery 0.31*** −0.63*** 0.43*** 0.27*** −0.04 
External audit 0.79*** 0.44*** 1.07*** 0.66*** 1.00*** 
Foreign ownership −0.03 −0.17 0.03 0.15 −0.39 
Control Variables      
Firm age 0.45*** 1.04*** 0.12* 0.51*** 1.33*** 
Firm size dummy (Large)      
Small size −0.24*** −0.02 −0.38*** −0.22*** −0.22 
Medium size −0.24*** −0.16 −0.23* −0.24*** −0.31* 
Subsidiary status 0.08† −0.05 0.04 0.06 0.38* 
Export sales  0.07 0.49 −0.10 0.11 0.31 
External Financing 0.08 0.32† 0.06 0.13* −0.10 
Listing status −0.25† −0.70* 0.00 −0.36* 0.10 
Tax Inspection −0.24*** −0.08 −0.45*** −0.20*** −0.30** 
Market type −0.50*** −0.18 −0.65** −0.42*** −0.30 
Industry dummy 
(Manufacturing & other)      
Wholesale & retail 0.05 −0.29 0.07 0.10 0.15 
Construction −0.06 0.32 −0.01 −0.18 0.34 
Service 0.02 −0.17 0.04 0.02 0.14 
Country Dummy (Brazil)      
Russia  −2.82*** - - - - 
India −3.56*** - - - - 
China −1.50*** - - - - 
Adjusted R2 32.98 % 12.76% 10.58% 10.10% 23.45% 
F Value 219.57*** 5.38*** 17.38*** 35.98*** 16.59*** 
Notes: Standardized beta (β) reported. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
 
In order to obtain robustness, we conduct additional analyses using a step-wise variable selection process (Hult et al. 
2008). In the first step, we perform the regression with all independent variables. Based on the results, we filter the 
variables and use only the most relevant variables in a second regression (He, Zhang & Wang, 2015). Table 4 
summarizes the sensitivity test results. While there is little increase in Adjusted R2 between the original equations and 
the corrected equations, F values of the corrected equations are greater than those of the original equations. In general, 
the sensitivity test results are similar to the main results in Table 4, suggesting that the corrected equations provide 
further support for the results of this study.  
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Table 4. Sensitivity Test Result (using stepwise variable selection) 
Variable BRIC (N = 8,885) 
Brazil 
(N = 510) 
Russia 
(N = 2,217) 
India 
(N = 5,292) 
China 
(N = 866) 
Intercept 12.19*** 11.04*** 9.85*** 8.45*** 8.56*** 
Independent variables      
Informality −.30*** - −.40*** −.25*** −.38*** 
Bribery .31*** −.58** .43*** .27*** - 
External audit .79*** .42*** 1.06*** .66*** 1.00*** 
Foreign ownership - - - - - 
Control Variables      
Firm age .46*** .97*** .12* .52*** 1.31*** 
Firm size dummy (Large)      
Small size −.24*** - −.38*** −.23*** −.25† 
Medium size −.23*** - −.23* −.24*** −.34* 
Subsidiary status .08† - - - .39** 
Export sales   - - - - 
External Financing  .30† - .13* - 
Listing status −.25† −.63†  −.33*  
Tax Inspection −.24***  −.45*** −.20*** −.31** 
Market type −.54*** −.60* −.60*** −.49*** −.50* 
Industry dummy 
(Manufacturing & other)      
Wholesale & retail - - - - - 
Construction - - - - - 
Service - - - - - 
Country Dummy (Brazil)      
Russia  −2.81*** - - - - 
India −3.57*** - - - - 
China −1.50*** - - - - 
Adjusted R2 32.99 % 13.17% 10.79% 10.12% 23.73% 
F Value 337.39*** 13.87*** 30.80*** 60.58*** 34.64*** 
Notes: Standardized beta (β) reported. 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.  
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
This study aims to examine the factors that may influence the firm productivity of emerging markets using the WBES 
dataset. We find that informality, bribery, and external audit can influence labor productivity. Specifically, 
competitions with unregistered rivals have negative effects on labor productivity, while external audit and bribery are 
positively related to labor productivity. On the other hand, foreign ownership has insignificant impacts on labor 
productivity in BRIC countries. It may be because the portion of foreign ownership is quite low (M = 0.01, SD = 0.10), 
which may lead to slight or insignificant effects on labor productivity.  
 
This study contributes to the literature on internal management by identifying factors such as informality, external 
audit, etc., which might influence the labor productivity of emerging markets such as BRIC countries. The question 
of what business practices contribute to increases in firm performance of emerging markets has drawn attention form 
international business researchers. The findings of this study may provide answers to these types of questions by using 
empirical evidence of firm-level performance. Also, the findings contribute to the research on emerging markets by 
explaining how business practices or behaviors that result from the institutional features of emerging markets—such 
as high levels of informality and bribery—affect firm performance. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study will have practical implications for practitioners and policymakers of emerging 
markets. First, the findings imply that the regulatory framework plays a critical role in firm performance in emerging 
markets. In particular, external audit is the most important determinant of firm labor productivity. This implies that 
significant growth or increase in firm performance can be limited by the investment climate. Firm competitiveness or 
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growth is influenced by compliance to regulation. Likewise, informal competition is negatively associated with labor 
productivity and firm performance, which means that the government needs to reduce the level of informality or the 
ratio of the informal sectors to the national economy. 
 
Moreover, this study contributes to the understanding of firm productivity of emerging markets, which is an important 
area of interest to MNEs. The results of this study suggest several conditions that can contribute to improving the firm 
performance of both BRIC as a whole and each country separately. For example, in cases of India and Russia, bribery 
affects productivity positively, but it is negatively related to productivity in Brazil.  
 
Despite of these contributions, this study has some limitations, which will provide suggestions for future research. 
The main limitation is that this study uses the dataset from different years: Brazil from 2009, China from 2009, Russia 
from 2012, and India from 2014. This means that the enterprise survey in Brazil and China was conducted just after 
the global financial crisis of 2008, while the survey in Russia and India was conducted a few years after the immediate 
impact of the crisis. As the WBES questionnaires are standardized, there is no difference in the measures used in this 
study. However, the local economic conditions of BRIC as well as the global economy were different during these 
periods. To rule out the time issue, further research needs to be conducted on the data from the same point in time.  
 
Another limitation is that the Indian sample size is quite larger than the others, which means that the results may have 
been heavily influenced by the Indian sample. Cross-country studies need comparable samples in many aspects 
(Brislin, Lonner & Thorndike, 1973). Additionally, the findings of this study may not be applied to other emerging 
markets; that is, business environments or contexts differ between countries. For future research, samples should 
include other transitional economies such as Poland, Indonesia, and Mexico.  
 
Some studies mentioned or reported that there are different features between state-owned firms and privately owned 
firms (e.g., Sun, Vinig & Hosman, 2017), particularly in emerging markets (e.g., Ding, Zhang & Zhang, 2007; Nguyen 
& Van Dijk, 2012). Future research needs to be conducted on the difference in factors influencing firm performance 
between state-owned firms and privately owned firms in emerging markets. 
 
Furthermore, we have paid attention to labor productivity as a measure of firm performance. Labor productivity can 
be an important indicator for profitability, and thus labor productivity has been adopted as a measure of performance 
in organization research (Alaimo et al. 2009). However, organizational researchers have addressed that firm 
performance measures should reflect the multidimensional nature of organizational performance (Hult et al. 2008). 
Further studies should use diverse measures of organizational performance such as return on investment, return on 
assets, stock earnings, net profit, and so on.  
 
Additionally, this study does not include country-unique features of business environments such as guanxi, which 
means ‘relational network’ in China (Luo & Park, 2001; Peng, 2003). For example, the level of guanxi is considered 
as resources that have positive effects on competitive advantages in China; that is, it takes time to develop guanxi 
(Luo & Park, 2001). Therefore, for better performance, it is necessary to understand which local factors of business 
environment influence firm productivity. Future research needs to include local factors of business that are unique to 
a certain emerging market.   
 
In order to analyze the effects of explanatory variables on labor productivity, we use cross-sectional data that we 
collected at a certain point in time. A certain relationship suggested by this study may have reverse causality. For 
example, good performance leads firms to conducting external audit, which results in an external cost to them. In 
addition, the findings of this study show that firm age is positively associated with labor productivity, which may be 
related to a survival bias. Therefore, future research should use longitudinal data or include other emerging markets 
in order to generalize the findings of this study and to rule out survival bias.  
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